CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1182
12 February 1993

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BELARUS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

I have the honour and duty to inform you that on 4 February 1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 31 July 1991 and the Protocol thereto signed in Lisbon on 25 May 1992 as well as took a decision on the accession of the Republic of Belarus to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear State.

The aforesaid decisions have been adopted as an expression of the consistent course of the Republic of Belarus towards achieving the status of a non-nuclear and neutral State. It is the first time in the history of the international community that a sovereign State has voluntarily renounced the possibility of actual possession of nuclear arms. Having taken this unprecedented step, the Republic of Belarus expects that the world community would support its course of peace and its desire to make a meaningful contribution to strengthening European and global security.

Among all the countries legal successors to the former USSR as regards the START Treaty, Belarus is the first and only one to have declared its readiness to implement in full its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The fact that Belarus has ratified the above-mentioned Treaties without any conditions or reservations has once again demonstrated the consistent and constructive nature of its foreign policy.

GE.93-60260 (E)

The voting in the Supreme Soviet of Belarus proves that the course at achieving the status of a neutral and non-nuclear State is supported by parliamentarians representing all political factions. The resolution on the ratification of the Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol thereto was adopted all but unanimously, with just one deputy voting against.

The Republic of Belarus expects that its attitude towards nuclear disarmament issues would be duly appreciated by the international community, and it has every right to count on all-round financial assistance in dealing with the entire range of questions pertaining to the practical realization of the obligations assumed under the aforesaid Treaties as well as in effecting the conversion of military industries and modernization of technologies.

I would request you to make necessary arrangements to have the text of this note issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the delegations of all States members of the Conference as well as States participating in but non-members of the Conference.

(Signed) A. Mardovitch
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Belarus

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1183
18 February 1993

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
ON THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENTITLED
"NEW DIMENSIONS OF ARMS REGULATION AND DISARMAMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA"

(Adopted at the 643rd plenary meeting on 18 February 1993)

1. By paragraph C of decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992 dealing with the reconvening of the First Committee from 8 to 12 March 1993, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to transmit its views on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era". The Conference on Disarmament wishes to express its appreciation to the Secretary-General for his timely and useful report which offered an opportunity to ponder important issues of the present international reality.

2. The Conference is expressing herein its collective consideration of the issues within its competence addressed in that report.

3. With the end of the cold war, the prospects for disarmament and arms regulation have changed considerably. This has allowed the conclusion of additional major agreements in this field (Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction).

4. However, the end of the cold war and the beginning of effective arms reductions do not render the concept of disarmament and arms regulation obsolete. On the contrary, the new conditions of international security reinforce the relevance of disarmament and arms regulation, because they facilitate the conclusion of new bilateral and multilateral agreements that would establish and codify security at lower levels of armaments.

5. The new international environment does thus call for a new approach to international security.

6. With the changing international situation, the very concept of disarmament and arms regulation as a key element in pursuit of overall international security is being expanded and enriched:

- it can now even more readily be translated into concrete actions in keeping with the expectations of the international community;

- it now entails even more deep and verified reductions in the nuclear armaments of the two major Powers;

- it implies more and more the negotiation also of multilateral agreements;

- it now embraces all weapons of mass destruction;

- it also embraces conventional armaments;

- it includes more and more clearly the need, recognized by all, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their delivery systems;

- it also includes the recognized need to seek equal or better security and stability at lower levels of conventional armaments;

- it covers an increasingly broad spectrum of means of achieving security such as the implementation of confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as international verification;

- it also addresses the production, stockpiling and transfers of military equipment and technology, as well as the conversion of military capacities to peaceful uses;

- it also implies recognition of the fact that nuclear disarmament remains a priority task of our times.

7. Disarmament and arms regulation is thus not an end in itself but can now fulfil its real task as being a major instrument of international security.

8. Together with unilateral measures, and bilateral and regional agreements, disarmament needs more and more a multilateral approach and is a collective responsibility.

9. As the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community, the Conference therefore has an increased role to play. The recent conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention is, in this respect, a relevant example. It has indeed demonstrated that, even in areas directly affecting vital strategic, economic and industrial interests of so many different States, it is possible to reach an international consensus.

10. This increased role implies that the Conference remains, more than ever, the multilateral negotiating body of the international community in the field of disarmament.

11. There is a growing recognition of the integration of the various components of international security, and also of the fact that disarmament is a collective responsibility. In this respect, the application of the rule of consensus in the Conference ensures that decisions are taken on a broad basis, and thus encourages broad participation and facilitates the universal adherence to multilaterally negotiated agreements.

12. Moreover, the multilateral elaboration of norms containing verification provisions based on international controls ensures confidence in their implementation and therefore their universal acceptance; in this respect the rights of States to have access to technologies necessary for their economic and industrial development should be ensured.

13. There is also a clear complementarity between regional and global approaches to arms limitation and disarmament. In this respect, the regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in the global efforts to strengthen international peace and security, arms limitation and disarmament. The objective of regional security should encourage universal adherence to global multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreements. In negotiating multilateral agreements, in particular in the field of confidence-building measures, the Conference should take into account all the security concerns of States in their regional context.

14. In order to meet the new challenges, the international community needs to rely on an effective multilateral machinery, with the existing tools at its disposal. For its part, in order to fulfil effectively its tasks enhanced by the new international conditions, the Conference has decided to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning, including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. The Conference is determined to proceed expeditiously on these issues.

15. The determination of the Conference is also reflected in its decision, adopted at the outset of its 1993 session, to begin immediately its work on: "Nuclear Test Ban", "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" and "Transparency in Armaments". For this purpose, the Conference immediately established Ad Hoc Committees on these items.

16. As a negotiating body, the Conference maintains its own special status with respect to the other multilateral disarmament fora, in particular the First Committee of the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

17. While maintaining its special status, the Conference remains responsive to the concerns of the international community. The Conference takes into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly as well as proposals presented by Member States and decides how to proceed. As a negotiating body, it has, according to its rules of procedure, to determine by consensus on which items there appears to be readiness to negotiate. As to its functions, it is the sense of the Conference that at this juncture it can best serve the international community by preserving its role as the sole multilateral global negotiating body on disarmament.

18. Finally, the Conference trusts that the Secretary-General, within existing resources, will continue to enable the Office of Disarmament Affairs to fulfil effectively the important task assigned to it by the Member States, including the provision of adequate services to the Conference.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1184
18 February 1993

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE ONGOING REVIEW OF THE AGENDA, COMPOSITION AND METHODS OF WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

(Adopted at the 643rd plenary meeting on 18 February 1993)

1. By paragraph (c) of its decision 47/422 of 9 December 1992 dealing with the reconvening of the First Committee from 8 to 12 March 1993, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Conference on Disarmament to transmit to the Chairman of the First Commmittee "the status of [the Conference's] ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February 1993.". This report, adopted by the Conference by consensus, is pursuant to that request.

2. As noted in the report of the Conference on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era", the qualitative changes resulting from the new international situation and the new possibilities that have opened for enhanced international security through disarmament with the development of co-operative relations among States, have highlighted the indispensable character of the Conference for the negotiation of multilateral agreements.

3. The Conference offers a unique instrument for the harmonization of efforts by all the parties engaged in negotiations, members and non-members alike. The recent conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction is a case in point. In its resolution 47/54 E of 9 December 1992, adopted without a vote, the General Assembly welcomed the conclusion of the negotiations on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, stating also that its conclusion "reaffirmed the need for and the importance of the Conference as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community".

4. The Conference decided, at the end of its 1992 annual session, to focus its attention on its improved and effective functioning, with particular reference to the important areas of the membership and agenda during the intersessional period, and to continue consideration of its methods of work (see the Conference on Disarmament's Report to the General Assembly, CD/1173, paragraphs 11 to 19). The General Assembly, in the above-mentioned resolution 47/54 E, noted with satisfaction the results achieved so far on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, including the

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decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda, as well as the decision of the Conference to continue the process at its 1993 session; and furthermore encouraged the Conference in its ongoing review of its agenda, membership and methods of work (see resolution 47/54 E, last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 3).

5. Most of this work has been conducted through informal open-ended consultations for the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which have been chaired by Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan during the last three annual sessions.

6. In its annual report, the Conference decided to entrust its President at that time, Ambassador Michel Servais of Belgium, with the task of conducting consultations during the inter-sessional period after the end of the 1992 annual session of the Conference, and to report back to the Conference at the beginning of the 1993 annual session.

7. During that period, Ambassador Servais met intensively, both in Geneva and in New York during the First Committee session, with members as well as non-members participating in the work of the Conference, which had officially requested membership.

8. Pursuant to the request of the Conference when it gave him the task, Ambassador Servais presented a report to the first meeting of the Conference during its 1993 session, on 18 January 1993 (CD/PV.636). He informed the Conference, that, on 8 December 1992, he had held open-ended consultations with all those delegations whom he had already met in a series of individual and group consultations, and had made a statement noting the progress made and that no conclusive results had been achieved. That statement was distributed to all participants. He had continued his consultations after 8 December 1992, and noted that there was no change in the assessment he had made in that statement, which is annexed to this report.

9. The question was also discussed at informal consultations at the opening of the 1993 annual session. At the second plenary meeting, the President of the Conference, Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil, read out the following statement on the Conference's agenda:

"(1) There is an understanding in the Conference that, at the outset of its 1993 session, the Conference decides to adopt as its agenda the agenda of its 1992 session, while noting that its on-going consultations on the review of this agenda will be intensified:

1. Nuclear test ban.

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

8. Transparency in armaments.

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

(2) The Conference further agrees, without prejudice to any future decisions on the organizational framework of other items, to begin its work immediately on: "Nuclear Test Ban", "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" and "Transparency in Armaments". For this purpose, the Conference establishes Ad Hoc Committees on these items with the following mandates:

- Nuclear Test Ban : the result of the 1992 consultations conducted by the special coordinator on this item (CD/1179)

- Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space : document CD/1125

- Effective international arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons : document CD/1121

- Transparency in Armaments : the decision of the Conference on 26 May 1992 (document CD/1150).

(3) The Conference also recalls its decision to intensify its consultations on its improved and effective functioning including its decision to carry out consultations on the issues of its membership and agenda. For this purpose, I confirm that I shall appoint two Special Co-ordinators to conduct consultations on the issues of membership and agenda.

Lastly, I understand that it is the intention of interested members to continue their on-going open-ended informal consultations on non-proliferation in all its aspects."

10. Further to the Presidential statement, the Conference decided, at its 639th and 640th plenary meetings, to appoint the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committees.

11. At its 639th plenary meeting, the Conference also decided to appoint Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch of Mexico as Special Co-ordinator to review the issue of agenda and Ambassador Paul O'Sullivan of Australia as Special Co-ordinator to review the issue of membership. The Special Co-ordinators have commenced their work and engaged in intensive consultations. They will continue to work actively with the aim of obtaining agreement on both issues.

12. In accordance with its decision of 28 January 1993, the Conference pursued its informal consultations on the review of its agenda. There was general agreement that the question of the Conference's agenda is part of the broader issue of its methods of work, rules of procedure, composition and, ultimately, the role of the CD itself. It was recognized that there is a need to introduce changes in its work in order to respond more effectively to the challenges and opportunities of a changing international order. It was recalled that in 1979 the Conference began dealing with the cessation of the

arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures, taking into account, inter alia, the relevant provisions of the documents of the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the following areas:

I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;

II. Chemical weapons;

III. Other weapons of mass destruction;

IV. Conventional weapons;

V. Reduction of military budgets;

VI. Reduction of armed forces;

VII. Disarmament and development;

VIII. Disarmament and international security;

IX. Collateral measures, confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;

X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

13. It was agreed that the preceding areas, while not exclusive, offered a wide range of possibilities for a contemporary agenda to further its work. In the light of the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, and taking into account the recommendations of the General Assembly and the proposals by Member States of the Conference, it was agreed to continue consultations with the aim of identifying specific items to be included in its future programme of work.

14. The Conference on Disarmament has appointed a Special Co-ordinator to consider the question of the possible expansion of its membership. The Special Co-ordinator has already begun consultations with Member States of the Conference on Disarmament. These consultations will continue with the aim of producing an agreed revised proposal for a new CD composition as soon as possible.

15. In connection with its methods of work, as noted above the Conference has reviewed them on a continued basis by adapting its rules of procedure, whenever necessary, and by agreeing on a number of other procedural arrangements to facilitate its work. Among them, various decisions were taken to expedite the participation of non-members in the activities of the Conference. Co-ordination of this aspect has been conducted in the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference itself.

16. The Conference will continue to address, as an important and urgent matter, the expansion of its membership, its agenda and methods of work. It intends to report to the General Assembly on the results of its deliberations on those questions at the end of its 1993 session.

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AT THE INFORMAL OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS HELD ON 8 DECEMBER 1992

I wish to welcome all of you to this meeting held on those matters on which the Conference instructed me to conduct consultations during the intersessional period after the end of the 1992 annual session. Although I was requested to report back to the Conference only at the beginning of the 1993 annual session, I have considered it useful to keep you informed of developments in connection with the two important areas concerned by those consultations: the agenda and the expansion of the membership of the Conference. It seems to me that, by doing so, I will respond to the new developments that arose during the recent session of the First Committee, in particular its future session on 8-12 March 1993 and, at the same time, enhance the requirement of transparency to deal with those two subjects. Some members stressed the importance of ensuring adequate information for all in the process of consultations, a view that I fully share and intend to promote all along. Needless to say, the incoming President and the Secretary-General support this approach, the only one which will ensure success in these two matters.

As you know, immediately after the completion of the 1992 annual session and before we proceeded to New York to attend the First Committee, I conducted with the incoming President and the Secretary-General informal consultations with the members of the CD, as well as with a number of non-members. We did so in view of the fact that no distinction was made in the mandate given to me between members and non-members. Furthermore, as the questions of the agenda and expansion of the membership also are of direct concern to the non-members, it seemed to us that the need for transparency also applied to them. Accordingly, we invited to the consultations those non-members who have requested membership and had participated in the work of the Conference during its 1992 session. I also responded positively to a couple of requests from non-members who had participated in the 1992 annual session, although they had not yet requested the status of members, as they took the initiative in transmitting to me their views on those subjects. Nineteen non-members were consulted. Among the members, only one delegation was not available for those consultations.

Parallel to the deliberations of the First Committee, we were also able to clarify certain points concerning the consultations held in Geneva and, in a couple of cases, were approached by non-members who wished to be informed about how the consultations were proceeding.

With a view to maintaining transparency, I decided to refer to these questions in the statement in which I introduced the report of the Conference at the opening meeting of the First Committee on 12 October. On that occasion, I drew the attention of the Committee to the mandate given to me by the Conference, noting that the consultations had already started in Geneva during September and that they would continue in the following weeks. I emphasized the commitment of the Conference to conduct a comprehensive review of the question of the expansion of the membership, with the view to taking a positive decision in 1993. It was on the basis of this statement that the consultations continued in New York with some members of the First Committee.

I should like to add that, as you know, in the resolution adopted without a vote by the First Committee on the report of the Conference, it is noted with satisfaction the results achieved so far on the subject of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, including the decision to carry out consultations on the issues of the membership and agenda of the Conference, and the decision of the Conference to continue the process at its 1993 session. Paragraph 3 of the same resolution encourages the ongoing review of the agenda, membership and methods of work of the Conference. I welcome this action by the General Assembly, which reflects that our concern for transparency has brought this matter to the attention of all the members of the UN. More recently, the First Committee adopted a decision to reconvene from 8 to 12 March 1993 and requested the Conference to transmit to the Chairman of the First Committee the results of its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold war era" by 15 February 1993, as well as the status of its ongoing review of its agenda, composition and methods of work by 20 February 1993. Clearly this decision adds to the need to deal with these questions as expeditiously as possible.

As additional background to our discussions today, I wish to inform you that an additional request for membership has been received from Croatia on 5 November 1992. On the same date, the Secretary-General of the Conference circulated the relevant communication to all members of the Conference.

I should like now to report to you on the result of the first round of consultations on both subjects, that is the expansion of the membership and the agenda.

In connection with the question of expansion, I have requested the Secretary-General of the Conference to prepare an informal background paper on the composition of the Conference. It is up to the members to decide how useful that informal paper would be, but we felt that we would save time and discussion by simply providing you with this information, which you might have requested in any case. You will find there the changes in the membership of the multilateral disarmament negotiating body since 1959. The informal paper addresses both the enlargements in the membership since that time and the procedure followed for each expansion. If anything, I would add to the information contained in the informal paper that the enlargements were not preceded by lengthy discussions on the relative importance of various principles or approaches to expand the Conference, but rather in response to specific requests for membership or to certain political conditions in the world which made it necessary for the Conference to invite some States to join it.

The Secretary-General is also circulating a list of requests for membership with an indication of the dates on which they were transmitted to the Conference.

May I now deal with my consultations with the members, some of which expressed views on a personal basis. In general, I noted that the need for expansion was widely recognized, with the exception of two members who, while not opposed to take a decision in 1993, felt that it might be advisable to wait until the international situation evolves further. Having said this, I

will now deal with the type of expansion envisaged by members. Only few held the view that the expansion should take place along the lines of the decision still pending since 1983, that is, an enlargement by not more than 4 to 5 members. A wide majority of those consulted felt that this solution was either not possible or unacceptable. Two members were of the view, on a personal basis, that the CD could become open-ended. They also expressed interest in the suggestion of Ambassador Hyltenius for a more precise type of open-ended arrangement, according to which the Conference would be made open to all States which applied for membership. On the other hand, many members opposed the concept of an open-ended Conference and maintained that the expansion should be limited, although larger than the figure of 4 to 5 suggested by very few delegations. Some members noted that the expansion should be by more than 5, without indicating any particular figure. Other members expressed preference for an enlargement of 10 to 15. A substantial majority of those in favour of a larger expansion supported the figure of approximately 20, which could be more or less depending on the situation at the time of the final decision. Some members noted that they were prepared even for an expansion by 30 members. Twelve delegations suggested that those candidates who had been active or had formally made their request for membership be incorporated as members of the Conference. Three members expressed very strong opposition to this idea, rejecting the concepts on which the suggestion had been advanced.

It would come as no surprise to you if I tell you that the majority of non-members expressed support for an open-ended Conference, with approximately half of them indicating that they would support the idea advanced by Ambassador Hyltenius. In fact, only one non-member objected to the open-ended principle. Others were of the view that an expansion by 4 to 5 would be unrealistic and suggested to expand either by 10 to 15 or 20 new members, with a majority supporting the last figure. Two non-members proposed rotation in the membership, but this idea found opposition by members as well as several non-members.

It is clear to me now, after the first round of consultations, that some of the alternatives opened to us will not reach consensus, as opposition to them is very strong, either on political considerations or because, in the view of those consulted, the disavantages far outweigh any advantages. This is the case with the possibility of limiting the expansion to no more than 4 or 5 new members, as well as of an open-ended Conference, although as I noted before, the variant represented by Ambassador Hyltenius' idea raised some interest. The same applies to the concept of rotation, which was raised by only a few delegations and is also strongly opposed.

Still, there is a wide area which we can continue to explore, in particular those aspects which have not received objections. I shall continue to pursue them, but for the moment I would like to stress that there is a significant trend in favour of a substantial expansion by approximately 20 members.

As regards the criterion on which an expansion would be based, several members have expressed support for a geographical approach, in some cases adjusted on the basis of political and military considerations. Other members favoured an approach which would give equal emphasis to political, military as

well as geographical considerations. Still fewer members referred to the need to maintain balance, but without clarifying how that would be achieved. The view was also expressed that recent developments had created a new situation, leading to the emergence of new nuclear and conventional military powers, an element which should not be ignored in disarmament negotiations. Some members also noted that, as a result of the next expansion of the membership or even before, there might be a need to review the structure of the group arrangements in the Conference. Two members said specifically that the expansion should not be "Eurocentric", arguing that Europe is already well represented. Several members rejected this notion, which they consider unrealistic. Finally, one member drew attention to the voting pattern at the General Assembly as a criterion to be followed.

As you can see, several approaches have been discussed in connection with the expansion: geographical as well as political, and the military significance of some candidates. A serious problem will be, therefore,to try to find beforehand what would be their relative weight. It seems to me that it may become an endless and unuseful exercise leading to nowhere. It might be better for the President to proceed with his private consultations on the candidates and to come up with an agreed solution to this question.

One of our colleagues wisely advised me that the expansion should be a package arrangement, avoiding consideration of candidates on a case-by-case basis. To this I would like to add that, in my view, it is not absolutely essential that additions to one group should be arithmetically matched by additions to other groups. Experience has shown that this is not always possible. It seems to me, however, that in arriving at a consensus it will be necessary to show mutual accommodation, keeping in mind the question of what I will call an <u>overall</u> balance which could be developed by reviewing the list of possible candidates for membership, whether or not they have already formalized their requests.

In connection with the procedure to be followed when we agree on the candidates for expansion, you will find in the background paper circulated by the Secretariat that various approaches were followed in the past. I would like to draw your attention to the procedure agreed the last time, when the CD was constituted. That arrangement made it possible to expand the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, without political considerations preventing the addition to the CD of some new members, either because of the status of bilateral relations or other factors, such as a strict approach to a numerical balance.

I would like now to review the question of the agenda. The first point raised during the consultations was whether it was necessary to change the present annual agenda. A wide majority of delegations supported or were prepared to accept changes in the agenda. Only four members expressed the view that there was no need to change the agenda or that they were happy with it as it is, although some among them indicated that they would be flexible if changes were put forward. Among the non-members, equally a wide majority supported or were willing to see changes, while only one among those consulted felt that the agenda might remain as is.

In connection with specific items on the agenda of the Conference, there has been a wide range of views on what should be in and what should be out. In reviewing the suggestions put forward, one finds that to include all of them would mean a longer list of items than what we have had up to now.

Some trends, however, can be identified with certainty. Many delegations have stressed the importance of two items on the present agenda, "Nuclear Test Ban" and "Transparency in Armaments", though in the last case the view has often been expressed that it would be necessary to review specific areas which might lend themselves for action under the agenda item. Next in the list of preferences follows the question of "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapons States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", where there is strong feeling that the Conference should be able to move towards an agreement. The following item in order of interest is "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space", with a number of delegations stressing the importance of devoting efforts to the consideration of confidence-building measures in outer space. Next in order of preferences is the question of including a new item on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, a view was expressed that this matter should in fact be addressed by the UNDC. Another view was that the item should be on the agenda to address nuclear non-proliferation and that, in a certain way, the Conference should become the preparatory committee for the next Review Conference of the NPT. Another subject which has drawn attention is the consideration of confidence-building measures, global and regional, as a separate item or as an element of "Transparency in Armaments". Not only these subjects have been the most frequently mentioned by delegations but also no opposition has been voiced on them. The agenda item relating to radiological weapons has not drawn much attention, but several views were advanced in connection with the approach to the two tracks in the agenda item. Among those addressing the issue, it is felt that the two tracks should become separate items or sub-items of other items on the agenda. As regards the present agenda items 2 and 3, relating to "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" and the "Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters", the membership is divided into three different groups of approximately equal strength: to keep them on the agenda as they are, to drop them from the agenda, or to reformulate them, possibly by merging both concepts. Members are also divided with respect to the present agenda item 8 "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". Some members wish to keep it, and among them, the view was expressed that it could be usefully limited to a consideration of confidence-building measures and verification. Other members believed that it should be deleted from the agenda. A third view was that it should be kept on the agenda, but it should not be a matter for consideration until conditions make it possible.

Other subjects mentioned, but not at the same level as those that I have already mentioned, are the following: the possible role for the CD in developing verification procedures for existing disarmament agreements, the ban on the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, and conventional disarmament, including regional measures. One member drew attention to the question of disarmament and development.

In connection with the question of a possible role for the CD in developing verification arrangements for existing disarmament agreements, reference has been made during the consultations to rule 23 of the rules of procedure, which would make it possible for the parties in those agreements to participate fully in any subsidiary body dealing with that subject.

Many members have stressed during the consultations the need to come up with a reduced agenda. Some among them have noted that we should delete those items on which negotiations are not possible. As you can see, any requirement to reduce the agenda clashes with a detailed list that is emerging from the consultations. Clearly, harmonization of these two elements does not seem within reach at present. We should therefore choose between the two options, or think in terms of agenda items with several sub-items. This may be a possible solution to the question. In this connection, the view was also expressed that the annual agenda may require the addition of new items due to requests of the General Assembly or for reasons of urgency, both possibilities being envisaged in our rules of procedure. Thus, in this view, the requirement of a reduced agenda would be relative.

Non-members have also expressed views on the agenda and, in general, trends seem to be close to those emerging in the case of the members. The agenda items "Nuclear Test Ban" and "Transparency in Armaments" are singled out by a wide majority as priority matters. The same divisions observed among the members appear in connection with the items 2 and 3 dealing with "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" and "Prevention of Nuclear War, including all Related Matters", with equally strong views in each case. Other preferred subjects are non-proliferation, verification of disarmament agreements, conventional disarmament, confidence-building measures and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, almost equal interest being shown on each of them. There are also differences among non-members on the advisibility of keeping item 8 on the agenda. One non-member suggested two new items, entitled "Disarmament and Development" and "Disarmament and International Security".

It seems obvious that the question of the agenda will require further consultations, in particular on certain subjects where delegations are divided. However, much ground has been covered, in the sense that now we have a clear idea of the preferences of many members. This will be helpful to us in advancing ideas on our future agenda. While every effort needs to be done to achieve an agreement quickly, it seems to me that we would be wise in envisaging at a certain point the opening of our work in 1993 with the provisional agenda that contains the items adopted for the previous year, minus the item dealing with chemical weapons, following the practice of the Conference every year. This provisional agenda could be circulated by the Secretary-General and be the subject of an announcement by the President at the opening of the annual session, without formal approval, which will only take place when agreement is reached on the 1993 agenda. This arrangement may help us to start our substantive work by proceeding quickly to set up subsidiary bodies on a limited number of items, since in the light of the requests received from the General Assembly in its recent decision on disarmament machinery we may need to concentrate our work on certain substantive questions. In a way, my consultations already point to three or four items which attract the attention of many delegations. Of course, it will be to the incoming President to consult on these matters.

Although not a subject of my consultations, I wish to draw your attention to the question of the requests addressed to us by the General Assembly which I have just mentioned. In the decision adopted by the First Committee this year, according to which that body will hold a session on 8-12 March 1993, we are requested to transmit very early, by 15 and 20 February 1993, the results of our consideration of the report of the Secretary-General and information on the status of our review of the agenda, composition and methods of work. That means that we should, in addition to the organization of our activities on substance, deal with these matters from the beginning of the annual session or even earlier. In connection with the report of the Secretary-General, members wishing to have their views reflected in our report should deliver statements at plenary meetings during the first two weeks of the annual session. The other subjects may be covered by reference to these consultations and, in connection with our methods of work, we shall come back to this question later. In any case, I wish for the moment to note that the Conference has already its own rules of procedure, on the basis of which it has developed certain practices. Such practices are updated periodically by our informal consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, which have been a useful arrangement to ensure that our procedures evolve whenever necessary.

I have no further comments at this stage. The Secretariat will be circulating now this statement, in order to facilitate our future consultations. Of course, I will be happy to respond to any question that you may wish to ask at this stage.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1185
2 March 1993

Original: ENGLISH

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT ON THE THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE AD HOC GROUP OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS TO CONSIDER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY SEISMIC EVENTS

1. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, initially established in pursuance of the decision taken by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976, held its thirty-fifth formal session from 15 to 26 February 1993, in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Dr. Ola Dahlman of Sweden. This was the twenty-seventh session of the Group, convened under its new mandate by the decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its 48th meeting on 7 August 1979.

2. The Ad Hoc Group is open to all member States of the Conference on Disarmament. It is also open on a standing basis to all non-member States which have been invited upon their request by the Conference on Disarmament to participate in its work. Accordingly, scientific experts and representatives of the following member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

3. Scientific experts and representatives from the following non-member States of the Conference on Disarmament participated in the session: Austria, Czech Republic, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Spain and Switzerland.

4. Upon invitation by the Conference on Disarmament, a representative of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) made a presentation which was appreciated by the Ad Hoc Group. The Group considers that its contact with IAEA should be maintained, with informal exchange of relevant information and experiences.

5. During the session 34 papers containing information on national investigations related to the work of the Group were presented by experts from: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, South Africa, Sweden and United States of America.

6. The Ad Hoc Group completed a comprehensive seismological evaluation of its Second Technical Test (GSETT-2). The results are contained in the Group's Conference Room Paper 228, and a summary is annexed to this progress report. The Ad Hoc Group expressed its appreciation to Professor Hans-Peter Harjes of Germany, who coordinated this evaluation effort and drafted the evaluation report.

7. The Ad Hoc Group conducted in-depth discussions on the reassessment of the concept of a global system for the exchange of seismic data worked out in its Fifth Report (CD/903), based on material prepared by working groups of participating experts. The discussions were focused on the overall design and plans for future testing of the concept.

8. The Ad Hoc Group agreed that its overall goal is to design and test concepts for a system for international seismic data exchange which provides States with data and information for their national CTB verification needs. The Group noted that future monitoring environments and specific monitoring requirements will be set by participating States and may change over time. It is therefore impossible to establish a priori detailed requirements for the system. However, the Group agreed upon some important design goals for a future system:

- Prompt and direct access to all data which are essential to system operation;

- Convenient access to any supplementary relevant data that might be useful;

- The goals should be accomplished within realistic manpower and budget resources.

The Group agreed that it would be necessary to conduct a cost-performance analysis of global seismic networks of different configurations.

9. The Ad Hoc Group considered that the main elements in the envisaged global system should have the following characteristics:

(i) A global network of stations

This is a three-tiered network: The first tier, the alpha network, provides the primary detection and initial event location estimates for the global system. The second tier, the beta network, augments the alpha network by providing data to improve hypocentre determination for events detected by the alpha network. The third tier, the gamma network, is not formally a part of the system, but provides supplementary data and information considered by the National Data Centers (NDCs) to be important to improving the capability of the global system.

The seismological evaluation report of GSETT-2 noted that arrays were the most important stations in the GSETT-2 network and should be the backbone of any future monitoring system. The global network of stations, particularly the alpha network, should include arrays to the greatest degree practicable.

consider issues related to the design and implementation of a global monitoring system for CTB verification. Many participants of the Group were able to attend and contribute to the workshop. This aided in the Group's continued work. The Group expressed its support to the efforts by Egypt to provide basic seismological training and information on the work of the GSE to scientists in Africa and Arab countries. The Group also expressed its support to those countries which assisted Egypt in this important work.

13. The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 26 July to 6 August 1993, in Geneva.

ANNEX

Summary Report on the Seismological Evaluation of the Group of Scientific Experts' Second Technical Test (GSETT-2)

This annex summarizes the seismological evaluation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts' Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) conducted from 22 April to 2 June 1991. The full evaluation report is contained in the Ad Hoc Group's Conference Room Paper 228. The report focuses on evaluating the detection and location performance achieved by the GSETT-2 network during the experiment. In addition, the reported magnitude values are discussed.

Sixty stations contributed data during GSETT-2, including 12 arrays and 48 single-site three-component stations. The global distribution of the participating stations was very heterogeneous, resulting in large regional variations in detection thresholds and location accuracies.

An analysis of the stations reporting the 3,715 events listed in the GSETT-2 Final Event Bulletins (FEBs) reveals the crucial importance of arrays to event detection and location. If no arrays had participated in GSETT-2, the remaining arrivals, reported by single stations only, would have been sufficient to define only 911 events.

The large database of seismic waveforms collected during GSETT-2 offered the first opportunity for a quantitative analysis of seismic station conditions and for studying their influence on spatial and temporal variations of the network detection performance. The noise amplitudes correlated well with geographic, tectonic and cultural station settings. Across the GSETT-2 network, noise amplitudes varied by more than a factor of 10 at frequencies near 1 Hz. This is the frequency range which is most important for teleseismic detection. In this frequency band, noise levels mainly decrease with increasing station distance to coast lines. In the high-frequency band (2-10 Hz), the noise level and its temporal variation decrease with decreasing density in the local human population and with increasingly competent emplacement geology (i.e. igneous or metamorphic lithologies).

An important aspect of the performance evaluation of GSETT-2 has been the completeness and quality of the Final Event Bulletin (FEB). The detection threshold of the GSETT-2 network was estimated by comparing the FEB to independent bulletins which are based on many more seismic stations, such as the Earthquake Data Report (EDR) of the United States Geological Survey. Moreover, the network detection performance was estimated by model simulations using the previously described station noise conditions. Both studies gave consistent results if the different model assumptions were taken into account.

During GSETT-2, the actually achieved 90 per cent detection threshold, using the EDR as a reference, was estimated at magnitude m_b = 4.4 in the northern hemisphere and m_b = 5.1 in the southern hemisphere. For the entire globe, the estimated 90 per cent detection threshold was m_b = 4.7. More precisely, this means that for a seismic event reported in the EDR of m_b = 4.7 or greater, there was at least a 90 per cent probability that the event appeared in the Final Event Bulletin (FEB) with a location difference less

than 3 degrees and an origin time difference less than one minute. It was noted that a number of additional events were reported in the FEBs, but with less accuracy in location and origin time. This suggests that the detection capability of the GSETT-2 network is significantly better than the threshold of m_b = 4.7, if the requirements to location accuracy are relaxed. This conclusion was supported by an evaluation of the detected initial phases at the GSETT-2 stations. Requiring two or more station detections to define an event, it was found that the 90 per cent global threshold for confirming events reported in the EDR (but not locating them) was as low as m_b = 3.8.

The heterogeneous global distribution of the GSETT-2 stations is reflected in a large variability of the detection performance. Fennoscandia had the best instrumental coverage during the experiment and consequently the best detection performance was achieved in this region. The 90 per cent detection threshold was estimated to be about magnitude 2.5. On the other hand, a poor detection performance (high detection threshold) close to magnitude 5 was estimated for regions with a sparse detection coverage, for example, parts of the southern hemisphere.

Besides the ever-present ambient noise, it is the so-called signal-generated noise which can occasionally influence the detection capability of a seismic network. During the time period of GSETT-2 a large earthquake occurred in the Western Caucasus, followed by numerous aftershocks. It was found that the resulting increase in detection threshold for the GSETT-2 network lasted a relatively short time and that stations detecting at high frequencies, such as regional arrays, are less affected than traditional stations by the interference from such events.

To evaluate the location performance achieved during GSETT-2, the same procedures were used as for the assessment of the detection performance. In general, there was a significant number of poorly located small events in the Final Event Bulletin (FEB). Taking the Earthquake Data Report (EDR) of the United States Geological Survey as a reference, the median location difference for the 765 common events was 37 km, with a remarkable scatter for individual events. On the positive side, the evaluation of the regional event location performance in Fennoscandia showed that in an area where the station coverage of the GSETT-2 network was good, the location accuracy approached that obtained by dense national networks. For events in Fennoscandia for which the true location was known from independent sources, the median FEB-location error was only about 10 km.

During GSETT-2, the 12 arrays provided slowness and azimuth data for most reported detections and 15 of the other 48 stations provided azimuth and angle of incidence values obtained from three-component processing. These directional data were used in event definition by the EIDCs. In the case of azimuth, the arrays out-performed the three-component stations by a factor which is substantially greater than the factor of two given in the event definition residual criteria. For slowness, the allowed a priori residuals seem to be met on average by arrays, but they were clearly too optimistic for three-component stations.

In general, the accuracy of slowness-vector estimates varied enormously among the three-component stations and arrays during GSETT-2. This variation

suggests that a longer observation period would be needed to calibrate stations and arrays on an individual basis in order to improve the quality of directional data used for epicentre determination.

Depth estimation of seismic events is an important discriminator between earthquakes and explosions because the latter are restricted to shallow depths of less than 10 km, a range in which only a small fraction of earthquakes occur. Much of the waveform analysis at the Experimental International Data Centres (EIDCs) was targeted towards improving the depth estimates and about one third of the FEB-events had at least one defining depth phase. It was found that it is difficult to determine depth accurately - in particular for small events, i.e. for magnitudes below $m_b = 4$. Almost no depth phases were found in the FEBs for events shallower than 10 km depth.

The most useful source parameter to describe the size of a seismic event is the magnitude. In the context of a seismic monitoring system, the body-wave magnitude m_b and the surface wave magnitude M_s have proved to be the most important scales. Also in describing the detection performance and the location accuracy in the previous sections, the magnitude scale has been essential. Unfortunately, there were insufficient and inconsistent data contained within the Final Event Bulletin (FEB) to make definite statements about magnitudes and magnitude scales with respect to the GSETT-2 database. Finally, a number of recommendations for the design of a future global system can be derived from the seismological evaluation of GSETT-2:

- If a homogeneous global detection and location performance of a future seismic network is desirable, the distribution of high-quality stations needs to be more uniform than during GSETT-2.

- Arrays were the most important stations in the GSETT-2 network and should be the "backbone" of any future monit ring system.

- Additional quality control measures should be made a specific part of the operating procedures at EIDCs and at stations and/or NDCs.

- The process of phase association and event location at EIDCs was more difficult than anticipated. Further development of association/location algorithms is required.

- Information from local and regional networks could have been better incorporated by the EIDCs. This information should be formalized so that it can automatically be interpreted by the EIDCs.

- To improve the three-component slowness vector estimate, a standard processing technique should be adopted for the whole network. The variation in the accuracy of slowness-vector estimates amongst three-component stations and arrays suggests a longer period of observation is needed to calibrate stations on an individual basis. An appropriate velocity model for each station should be used to convert from angle of incidence to slowness.

- Any future network should be calibrated with respect to standard travel-time curves and amplitude-distance relations. Station

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1186
26 February 1993

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA ON THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENTITLED "NEW DIMENSIONS OF ARMS REGULATION AND DISARMAMENT IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA"

I have the honour to transmit the text that was forwarded to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, giving the views of the Government of Canada on his report entitled "New dimensions of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed): A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

CANADIAN VIEWS ON THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

"NEW DIMENSIONS OF ARMS REGULATION AND
DISARMAMENT IN THE POST-COLD-WAR ERA"

Canada considers the Secretary-General's report to be a useful complement to "An agenda for peace". It offers the prospect of real solutions to the problems which face the United Nations in the peace and security field. This is especially true as the United Nations moves away from the cold war rhetoric and begins to define a course of action to enable the international community to respond more effectively to the new challenge of promoting a system of global cooperative security.

The evolution of geopolitical forces in the last four years has created new and more complex security challenges. The discipline of the cold war has dissipated without being replaced, with the result that regional conflicts have been able to flourish unchecked. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for the United Nations to adopt new procedures and new approaches to the security problems facing the world. This challenge was recognized in the "Agenda for peace". The task in addressing arms control in the post-cold-war era is to move away from the processes, groupings and mechanisms of the cold war and adopt new agendas and procedures designed to address today's and tomorrow's problems.

In this context, the conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention brings to the forefront three immediate challenges: (i) the need to confirm and strengthen through universal adherence and enhancing verification mechanisms as appropriate, existing global instruments (e.g. NPT, BTWC and the CWC itself); (ii) to develop further and harmonize where possible export controls of sensitive technologies; and (iii) to develop and apply regional arms control regimes, linking global and specific regional measures, as required (e.g. the Middle East peace process). For each of these, but particularly the latter, the direct essential linkage between security concerns and arms control measures will have to be emphasized. Confidence-building steps will be increasingly important.

Canada's priorities are effectively established: (i) Horizontal and vertical non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and of missile systems for their delivery. This includes the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. (ii) Effective action to prevent the excessive build-up of conventional arms inventories. (During the 1991 United Nations General Assembly 46th session debate on the arms Register we made it clear that our goal was not just transparency, but consultations among States in order to encourage more self-restraint in transfers and in order to help build broader consensus on means of avoiding excessive build-ups. Canada views the register as a means and not an end in itself.) (iii) Development and implementation of confidence-building measures - including appropriate verification mechanisms - for global and regional situations as required.

Despite positive developments in recent years, we recognize that the proliferation of the technology and equipment capable of making weapons of mass destruction continues to be a source of instability and, in the words of the historic Security Council summit Declaration of 31 January 1992 - a threat

to international peace and security. We encourage all countries to sign the chemical weapons Convention and to sign the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. In the words of the Secretary-General, the NPT must be extended indefinitely and unconditionally.

We wholeheartedly agree with the Secretary-General's observation that transparency in armaments and other confidence-building measures are an important trend to encourage and that the United Nations arms Register is an important practical step. We particularly welcome his assurance that the United Nations will do all it can to make the Register a success, including we assume ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to it. For our part, Canada has consistently and actively supported the concept of transparency in armaments. We intend to work actively to ensure that as many States as possible comply fully with the arms Register - providing both data and information - by the due date of 30 April 1993.

Canada is also encouraged to see a growing interest among nations in developing regional approaches to arms control and disarmament. Canada's view is that regional approaches to disarmament can make valuable contributions to our collective pursuit of the broader objectives of disarmament and international security. For example, in Vienna, negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and European conventional armed forces within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe have demonstrated the benefits that such a regional approach can offer to all participating States. In the Middle East as well, as part of the peace process, discussions are taking place on arms control. Other regional players are also taking a more concerted, active approach to regional security including within ASEAN and OAS.

Turning specifically to the Secretary-General's report, Canada supports the central thesis that three key themes - integration, globalization and revitalization - are the foundation stones of an intensified international effort to enhance the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament. In particular we support the assertion that the process of arms limitation and disarmament is the responsibility of every State. Likewise we agree with the Secretary-General that disarmament continues to be centrally relevant to international peace and security.

The global security environment has been changing rapidly since the end of the cold war. Opportunities and challenges abound as the international order is restructured. We agree in principle with the concept that disarmament and inspection procedures play an important part in the field of peace enforcement and arms limitation. We would add that verification of disarmament and arms limitation agreements can also facilitate United Nations activities with respect to preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. It is our view that the First Committee, UNDC and expert groups should be dealing with the role of the United Nations in verification. Verification may provide an important linkage among many of these previously separate concepts - a new integrative dimension. At the very least, the United Nations must be active in exploring new ideas in these areas. This issue should not only continue to engage the Security Council but also the broader United Nations membership.

Canada was interested in the Secretary-General's reference to an increased role for the Security Council in disarmament matters and, in particular, in the enforcement of non-proliferation. Given the range of views that currently exists among Member States on this proposal, Canada views the resumed session of the First Committee as an important opportunity for further dialogue thereon.

In Canada's view, the Office of Disarmament Affairs should be the focal point of a revitalized United Nations role in multilateral arms control and disarmament. Therefore, we particularly welcome the commitment, given by former Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky, to strengthening the ODA so that it can indeed function as such a focal point. We believe the United Nations has an important role to play in promoting informal mechanisms for security dialogue - particularly in regions or sub-regions where institutional frameworks for such discussions are not yet fully developed. In this manner, the ODA can help ensure that regional processes and mechanisms serve to reinforce and complement global norms. Canada commends these ongoing activities of the ODA.

Clearly many other Member States feel the same way as is evidenced by the support given to the three United Nations Regional Offices - and to other related activities of the ODA - at the Tenth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign. Participating Member States will recall that this year a trend of the past few years was dramatically reversed with an increase of over 50 per cent from the previous year's total. In this regard, however, we note that a greater effort must be made to address the disparity in pledges from one region to another.

The Secretary-General's proposal to examine the role of private international arms dealers and their connection to the burgeoning problem of international arms transfers is noted with interest. It is disturbing to observe that such transfers are being made at the cost of human, social and economic development. The proposal to establish a task force to provide Member States with advice on military conversion programmes is also to be commended. On the other hand we note that regional forums are also conducting similar studies; such duplication of effort should be avoided if possible.

We strongly agree with the Secretary-General that the time is ripe for a thorough reassessment by Member States of the United Nations disarmament machinery in order to ensure that it is able to meet new realities. A useful starting point, in our view, is to recall the main functions of each of the three multilateral ACD bodies - the First Committee, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament - then to identify problems in the effective carrying out of these roles and finally to seek to identify practical means of responding to these problems.

A. <u>The First Committee</u>

In Canada's view, the role of the First Committee - a global deliberative body - is to identify priorities on the multilateral ACD agenda and to build support and momentum as an essential first step in the broader process of international norm-building as it relates to arms control and disarmament. This process not only contributes to the identification and promotion of broad

principles but increasingly - as the arms Register so graphically demonstrates - focuses on concrete steps which the international community can take towards the achievement of these broad goals or norms.

The First Committee continues to provide a useful framework for the United Nations membership to elaborate and clarify positions on a variety of ACD issues. Rationalization of the First Committee's work is progressing, e.g. combining the debate on disarmament and international security items. We should now take the logical next step of combining action on these two sets of items. Only then will we have fully integrated our consideration of means - arms control and disarmament measures - with our desired end - the maintenance of international peace and security.

We need to accelerate the task of rationalization, of setting concrete and practical priorities and of ensuring fewer resolutions, and more genuine dialogue. Now that East/West polarization is over, there is the possibility for greater functional cooperation on specific issues among delegations from differing groups and perspectives. An example of this in the First Committee context is the merger of the Mexican and Western Core Group CTBT resolutions.

The length of the plenary debate in First Committee could be shortened, either through the elimination of oral statements or their limitation to a strict time limit of 10 minutes maximum. Additionally, the circulation of executive summaries along with printed texts could be encouraged. Ideally, Member States should strive to distribute their text at the very outset of the time allotted for plenary debate, thereby ensuring that the time normally used for the reading of texts could be devoted to more informal consultations among delegations. With respect to consideration of individual items, including the introduction of resolutions, a better overall system of grouping items might facilitate a more genuine interchange on related issues.

B. United Nations Disarmament Commission - UNDC

The UNDC is the second global deliberative body. Its primary role is to allow focused discussion of a limited agenda without the pressure of voting on resolutions. Its function encompasses conceptual discussion, consensus-building with respect to arms control and international security-related issues (e.g. transfer of technology), as well as the identification of global and regional measures for negotiations elsewhere. The UNDC also prepares the groundwork for the CD through the development of principles as well as providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the CD agenda.

We believe that a mechanism is required to provide a greater degree of linkage between the UNDC and the CD in order for UNDC deliberations to become more relevant and results oriented. Closer cooperation and some mechanism for linkage or dialogue is therefore required in the short term, if these two bodies are to remain relevant in the rapidly changing ACD environment. In the longer term, when membership of the two bodies is more similar, the merging of the two may be feasible especially if cost factors can be overcome. Greater linkage between the UNDC and the CD will, however, be problematic as long as membership of the CD remains restricted and UNDC membership universal.

Within the United Nations, the reform process in the UNDC is most advanced. For example, we are well on the way to achieving a rolling three-item agenda which, on the one hand, ensures a degree of predictability while, on the other, allows us to incorporate contemporary issues in a timely manner.

Beyond this, the UNDC is at the stage where it has too much time to engage in general debate but - without more advance preparation by delegations - too little time for in-depth dialogue on complex issues in which there exist some rather fundamental differences of view. In order for the UNDC to live up to its full potential, every effort must be made to circulate focused working papers - preferably reflecting joint efforts of a number of countries spanning differences of view - in advance of the session so delegations come prepared for in-depth dialogue.

C. Conference on Disarmament - CD

The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is of course to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The CD can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban and outer space. Conclusion of the CWC has, however, temporarily exhausted a meaningful agenda for that body. Negotiation in the CD of a CTBT to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all time remains a priority objective. There should be strong verification provisions building on the work of the Group of Seismic Experts to establish global monitoring mechanisms.

CD procedures and membership are closely linked but subsidiary to its substantive negotiating agenda. We have recognized for some time that the current CD membership, and possibly the CD itself, no longer reflects the changing international security environment. We are in favour of broadening CD membership to admit those States which have formally applied.

We also hope that the CD can energize movement on the issue of transparency in armaments. We hope that the current session of the CD will provide productive debate on this issue as well as with respect to radiological weapons and outer space.

The Secretary-General suggested in his report to have the CD take on the role of a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Canada has reservations about the notion of having the CD take on such a role. The focus of the CD should not be diverted away from being the sole body in the United Nations with the authority to negotiate global arms control agreements.

Conclusion

The three multilateral ACD bodies have distinct, yet complementary and interrelated functions. In Canada's view, the resumed session therefore offers a unique opportunity to: (1) reaffirm the distinctive roles of each of the three multilateral ACD bodies and of the Office of Disarmament Affairs as the "focal point" for multilateral ACD activity; (2) provide additional

impetus to the ongoing work of rationalization of the three ACD bodies; and (3) provide an opportunity for focused consideration of practical ways to enhance the effective interaction of these three bodies.

The report on a "New dimension of arms regulation and disarmament in the post-cold-war era", as with the "Agenda for peace", is a thought-provoking document. We agree with the assertion that there is a parallel between conflict resolution and disarmament; the process of conflict resolution must be supported by concrete arms control and disarmament measures.

Beyond this, is the need to liberate the term "arms control and disarmament" from its cold war preoccupation with numbers of weapons. As important as this is, arms control and disarmament is now seen to both embrace and constitute a part of a far broader process of confidence building, of transparency, of accountability, of verification and, most importantly, of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on genuinely cooperative mechanisms for creating and enhancing international peace and security. The Secretary-General's personal commitment to these issues is most welcome.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1187
26 February 1993

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LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING AN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PUBLICATION ENTITLED "BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION: UPDATE" 1/

I have the honour to transmit a new Canadian Arms Control and Disarmament publication, entitled "Bibliography on Arms Control Verification: update".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this publication in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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26 February 1993

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A PUBLICATION ENTITLED "THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND THE CONTROL OF SCHEDULED CHEMICALS IN CANADA" 1/

I have the honour to transmit a Canadian publication entitled "The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Control of Scheduled Chemicals in Canada".

I would be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to all member and participating non-member State delegations, under cover of a CD number.

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

1/ A limited distribution of this publication in English only has been made available to the members and non-members invited to participate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Additional copies are available from the Permanent Mission of Canada.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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26 February 1993

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LETTER DATED 17 FEBRUARY 1993 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A COMPENDIUM OF WORKING PAPERS OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM THE 1991 SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 1/

I have the honour to transmit a compendium of working papers of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons 1991 compiled by the Government of Canada.

I should be grateful if the necessary arrangements could be made for its distribution to the members and non-members who participated in the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) A.W.J. Robertson
Minister and Deputy Permanent
Representative to the
Conference on Disarmament

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